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1. Introduction 
Historically, a privately owned vertically integrated 
utility (VIU) carried out the supply of electricity. 
Generation, transmission and distribution were owned 
and managed by the same utility over a certain area. In 
some countries (e.g. Malaysia), the VIU was previously 
owned by the government. Later, the electricity supply 
industry (ESI) underwent a major transition worldwide, 
as new technology and attitudes towards utilities are 
being developed and changed. Basically, the objectives of 
these transitions are to enhance efficiency, to promote 
competition in order to lower costs, to increase customer 
choice, to assemble private investment, and to merge 
public finances. The tools of achieving these objectives 
are the introduction of competition, which is supported by 
regulation and the encouragement of private participation. 
These changes helped introduced a number of electricity 
market models, which include not only the structure 
models of ESI but also the electricity trading 
arrangements. 
Usually these models are designed appropriately with 
their local conditions and are being upgraded from time 
to time based on current issues that arise. There are four 
basic market model structures of the electricity supply 
industry that have been widely adopted such as: the 
vertically integrated utility or also known as a monopoly 
model, the purchasing agency model, the wholesale 
competition model  and the retail competition model [1]. 
These models seem to be the steps or processes in order 
to achieve the ESI objectives and build a better structure. 
There are also several countries that have tried to 
change the structure instantaneously, but it requires a 
detailed design as the complexity of the market model is 
proportional to the types of competition that are being 
held. The trading arrangement, on the other hand, is used 
as a method of measuring and accounting for flows into 
and out of the network, or over interconnectors, for 
transactions to be invoiced and paid [2]. 
For developing countries with small systems, the 
simpler and more modest market based on competition 
for the market or contracts are recommended [3]. There 
are several types of electricity trading arrangements 
applied in deregulated structures such as: single buyer 
market, pool market, bilateral contract and multilateral 
market. 
 
2. Electricity industry in Malaysia 
As a developing country, Malaysia is also following 
the worldwide trend to reform its electricity supply 
industry. Malaysia Electricity Supply Industry (MESI) 
started in 1894 when a private entity had generated 
electricity for its own consumption. In 1949, a national 
company named Central Electricity Board (CEB) was 
established, which later changed its name to National 
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Electricity Board (NEB) in 1965. The government of 
Malaysia has corporatized in 1990 and later privatized the 
NEB in 1992 under the name of Tenaga Nasional Berhad 
(TNB). The structure of TNB was unbundled to three 
private companies, namely TNB Generation Sdn. Bhd, 
TNB Transmission Sdn. Bhd and TNB Distribution Sdn. 
Bhd. However, the company structure remained vertically 
integrated and under regulated monopoly. The monopoly 
status of TNB on generation sector ceased when the 
Malaysian government decided to introduce the private 
investors - the Independent Power Producers (IPPs) in 
1994.The decision made is believed due to the massive 
blackout that occurred in September 1992, which affected 
nearly 18 million people for 48 hours. After an 
investigation on the nation’s power generation industry, 
the result verified that the nation's Power Company was 
unable to cater the growth in power demand due to the 
rapid development in several sectors such as residential, 
commercial, industrial and transport [4]. This incident is 
reported as the third in world’s worst power outages. It 
was also reported that the business loss for this outage 
was 220 million Malaysian ringgit which affects 
manufacturers in Malaysia’s Silicon Valley and briefly 
halted trading on the national stock exchange. 
The introduction of IPPs in the generation sector is 
aimed not only to aid TNB to overcome the electricity 
shortage issue and enlarge the electrical energy reserve 
margin but also to facilitate competitions among 
generators. The first generation IPPs were awarded 
licenses for five gas-fired power plants. The licenses for 
the second generation of IPPs were issued for five other 
gas-fired power plants from 1998-2004. Meanwhile, the 
third generation licenses of IPPs were awarded to two 
private coal-fired power plants. Despite this, the TNB still 
monopolizes the electricity market in terms of its 
transmission and distribution. Meanwhile, the Malaysian 
Government also planned to restructure its electricity 
supply industry in three phases to make it more efficient, 
transparent, equitable and more competitive.  The first 
phase involves a multi- seller and a single buyer who 
have been in operation since 2001, while the second 
phase introduces a multi- buyer mode where a 
competitive bidding process is introduced for the 
electricity distribution sector. On the other hand, the third 
phase will then feature regional market transactions 
involving transfers between Peninsular and East Malaysia 
and within the ASEAN Grid countries. However, the 
plans for creating a fully competitive market were 
abandoned by the government in view of the California 
experience. The government instead, decided to adopt the 
Managed Market Model (3M) which emphasized 
improving the existing arrangements and customizing 
terms to suit local condition [5]. Therefore, MESI 
remains its electricity market with a single buyer which is 
based on the first phase of restructuring as shown in Fig. 
1. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Diagram of MESI structure; single buyer market. 
 
The purpose of a single buyer is to equally divide 
power generation, transmission and distribution among 
IPPs and power plants of national electric power 
company and promoting fair competition [6]. In case of 
Malaysia, TNB plays the role as the power purchasing 
agency obliged to buy the electricity from IPPs. In return, 
the IPPs are being paid for the electricity delivered based 
on the power purchase agreement (PPA). Although IPPs 
were initially introduced to provide competition in 
general, the term under PPA in which these IPPs were 
introduced did not affect real competition in general.  
They were brought in on a basis of direct negotiation as 
opposed to competitive bidding. Moreover, this 
agreement provided guaranteed returns for the IPPs with 
very little risk borne by them over a 21-25 year tenure 
[7]. There are two types of payment in the PPA- capacity 
payment and energy payment. The capacity payment is 
paid for the availability for the plant to supply regardless 
of the amount of electricity usage. This payment is 
basically a method used for preventing long-term 
fluctuations in an IPP investment where its electricity is 
paid to recover a portion of its investment in the long run. 
On the other hand, the energy payment is paid for the 
electricity usage supplied by the IPPs. As a result of 
imbalance between generation and demand, TNB 
suffered massive profit erosion due to the agreement. 
Nevertheless, no effort or negotiation can further be done 
among the trading parties until the agreement period has 
expired.   
Therefore, it is important for the energy regulator, 
i.e. Energy Commission (EC) to look forward in replacing 
the existing single buyer market with a more transparent 
and competitive market model. As planned in the second 
phase restructuring, the pool market model was initially 
identified as a possible model for the replacement since it 
could provide a competitive and transparent electricity 
market for the trading parties. 
The application of this model, however could invite a 
lot of denials from both TNB and the IPPs if it is not 
implemented properly. For the IPPs, this may due to 
insecure incomes, especially for the generators with a 
higher-energy bid price which will have fewer 
opportunities to sell their output, especially during low 
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load demand. Since there is no capacity payment 
mechanism in pool trading mode, some generators will 
not receive any revenue at certain hours. On the TNB 
side, majorities of the power plants are not efficient 
enough due to ageing. This could increase the marginal 
cost of production, and as a result the TNB has fewer 
opportunities to sell the output due to higher marginal 
price. 
 In addition, there are possibilities of having a market 
power exercise in a pool market model. For example, 
large power producer companies could monopolize the 
market by arranging several bidding strategies, which 
may affect the stability of electricity market and rise up 
the market risks [8]. For these reasons, it is important for 
EC to look into the effects of applying this market model, 
especially on the generator revenue adequacy issue. 
The hybrid market introduced in this paper could be 
a possible market model to overcome aforementioned 
issue since it provides a better economic signal to the 
generators with firm participation in all trading periods. 
 
3. Electricity market model 
This section describes the basic concept and 
formulation of a single buyer market, pool market and the 
proposed market. The first two markets are initially 
designed to promote a competition environment, but 
some practical applications have shown the drawbacks of 
each model. The proposed market, on the other hand, is 
derived to overcome the shortcomings of the two market 
models. 
 
3.1 Single buyer market 
This market model is designed to encourage more 
investors, i.e. the IPPs to take part in Electricity Supply 
Industry (ESI). The IPPs also known as Non-Utility 
Generator (NUG) is an entity but not a public utility, 
which owns facilities to produce electric power. Many of 
the developing countries prefer to choose the single buyer 
market as the first step towards restructuring. The 
popularity of the single buyer market is due to less 
technical changes required, also several economic, and 
institutional factors. For example, the single buyer market 
helps to maintain a unified wholesale electricity price, 
which is simplifying the price regulation. However, it is 
suggested for a developing country to skip this stage and 
adopt a market model with multiple buyers immediately 
after unbundling as the single buyer model has major 
disadvantages, particularly in countries with weak or 
corrupt government and low payment discipline [9]. 
Theoretically, the existence of a number of IPPs can 
create competition between them and the local/public 
power producers and thus reducing the electricity price. 
However, in reality the competition seems does not 
exist due to the Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) 
signed between IPPs and the power purchasing agency. 
All power producers, including the local power producers 
and IPPs have to sell their output to the power-purchasing 
agency at an agreed purchase price. A power purchased 
agreements (PPAs) is a legal contract involving the 
generation and sales of electricity [10]. The purpose of 
the agreement is to avoid market risk. Many Asian, 
African and Eastern European countries prefer this 
concept because it is simpler and easier to apply. There 
are two types of payment that are included in the PPA; i) 
energy payment and ii) capacity payment. The energy 
payment can be mathematically expressed as 
 
( )EGiEGiiEP CPG ×=   (1) 
Where GEPi is the energy payment for a power 
producer i, PEGi is the power output generated by ith 
power producer in MW and CEGi is the energy price 
offered by ith power producer in RM/MWh. Meanwhile, 
the capacity payment is normally calculated in monthly 
basis. For hourly basis, the mathematical equation for the 
capacity payment can be written as 
 
( )GiGiiCP CPG ×=   (2) 
Where GCPi is the capacity payment for a power 
producer i, PGi is the power capacity available by ith 
power producer in MW, and CGi is hourly capacity price 
offered by ith power producer in RM/MW/h. Thus, the 
hourly revenue for a power producer i can be presented as  
 
EPiCGiiSB
GGG +=   (3) 
Thus, the mathematical equation for total revenue for 
power producers will be 
 
( ) ( )∑∑
==
×+×==
k
i
EGiEGiGiGi
k
i
SBiT CPCPGG
11
][  (4) 
Where k is the numbers of power producers involved, 
GT is the total generator revenue in RM/h.  
The electricity trading that occurred between the 
buyer and seller for this market is depicted in Fig. 2. The 
choosing mechanism that would reflect which power 
producers will supply for the demand of the country is 
based on a merit order. This means that the least cost 
power producers will be able to sell their output first 
compare to the expensive cost power producer. The cost 
of generation is influenced by the fuel cost and the 
variable operating cost factor. However, as the local 
power producer is responsible in conducting the dispatch, 
this may influence them to choose their own power plant 
to deliver the demand. 
 
Fig. 2 Diagram of single buyer electricity trading. 
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3.2 Pool market 
In a pool market, all energy supply is controlled and 
coordinated by a single pool market operator who is 
normally known as Independent Market Operator (IMO). 
The system operator is responsible in deciding the 
necessary actions to prevent violation of the grid 
constraints from occur [11]. All generators under a pool 
had to trade through IMO and follow the dispatch 
instructions based on the bid they submitted [12]. There 
are two main sides of entities participating in the market 
namely the producers/seller and customers/buyer. The 
IMO will consider the electricity bids and offers from 
these two entities to dispatch them in an economic 
manner depending on the submitted bidding price and 
MW available capacity [13]. This market model is 
depicted in Fig. 3. The seller and buyer do not directly 
interact to each other, but indirectly interact through the 
IMO.   
Basically, the pool market operation can be divided 
into two stages [1]. The first stage is called unconstrained 
dispatch and the second stage is called security 
constrained dispatch. During unconstrained dispatch, the 
power producers or generators are placed in an ascending 
order according to their bid prices without considering 
any system constraints. A number of the least cost 
generators are selected for dispatching to meet system 
predicted demands.  
 
 
Fig. 3 Diagram of pool electricity trading. 
 
The selected generators are called in-merit generators 
while the remaining generators are called out-merit 
generators. The bid price of the last dispatched generator 
determines the system marginal price (SMP). The SMP is 
determined by the point of intersection of supply and load 
curves in the bid price vs. generator power output graph 
as shown in Fig. 4. (ie. SMP = αG3 ). The SMP is the 
marginal cost of the marginal unit in the absence of 
transmission constraints. That is, the SMP is only 
determined from the generator's bids but independent of 
system physical constraints.   
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Fig. 4 Diagram of the aggregated supply curve from 
submitted bid price. 
 
There are two market bidding strategies that may be 
adopted in the pool market [14]: 
 
1) One sided pool: Generators submit bids and their 
available supply capacity. These bids are ranked in 
order of increasing price. Meanwhile, the demand 
curve is predicted to be a vertical line at the value of 
the load forecast. The highest priced bid that 
intersects with the demand forecast determines the 
market price, which is applied for the whole system.  
 
2) Two sided pool: Consumers can submit offers 
specifying quantity and price and ranking these 
offers in decreasing order of price. For generators, 
the same condition as in the one sided pool applies. 
The intersection of the supply and demand curves 
represent the market equilibrium. 
 
  In this market, Pool Purchasing Price (CPP) is the 
price that the IMO pays the generators for dispatching 
their power. The CPP is calculated as follows [15];  
 
)()1( LOLPVOLLLOLPSMPC PP +−=  (5) 
Where SMP is the system marginal price, LOLP is 
the loss of load probability, and the VOLL is the value of 
loss load. Therefore, the revenue for a power producer i 
can be mathematically expressed as 
 
( )PPPGiiPM CPC ×=    (6) 
Where PPGi is the power capacity available by ith 
power producer in MW and CPP is the pool purchase price 
in RM/MWh which can be calculated as shown in (5). 
Thus, the total revenue for all power producers can be 
written as 
 
( )∑∑
==
×==
k
i
PPPGi
k
i
PMiT CPGG
11
  (7) 
Where k is the numbers of generators involved, and 
GT is the total revenue in RM/h. All in-merit generators 
will be paid based on CPP (uniform price) neglecting their 
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initial bidding price. The domestic bidding strategies in 
pool trading may be influenced by the trade opportunities 
[16]. This market model would encourage generators to 
submit lower bidding price in order for them to be 
selected for dispatch. Moreover, these least expensive 
generators also will be able to get extra incomes during 
high demand. However, pool market is vulnerable to 
market power as the electricity price could go high and 
become volatile, especially at high load demand [17]. 
Some generators may seek for this opportunity to raise 
the market price by setting higher price on the marginal 
plant to reap profits [18]. In addition, the amount of SMP 
is dependent on demand and this has increased the 
possibility in market power exercise. 
 
3.3 The Proposed Market 
  
In the proposed method, it is suggested that the load 
demand is divided into two parts; base load demand and 
peak load demand. In the base load demand, the load is 
distributed to the generators based on the pro-rata basis. 
There is no competition among the generators at this 
level, and the generators will share this load proportional 
to their available capacity, i.e. generators with higher 
available capacity will have high percentage share of the 
base load demand. On the other hand, the remaining high 
load demand will be traded through competition of the 
energy bid price offered by each generator. Generator 
with a lower energy bid price has the priority to supply 
the remaining demand. The generator's payment for the 
base load demand would be based on the SMP while for 
the remaining load demand would be based their energy 
bid price. The MW level of base load demand will be 
determined from the daily load curve. The mathematical 
equation that represents each generator’s contribution to 
the base load demand can be written as; 
GTblk
i
Gi
Gi
Gibl P
P
P
P ×=
∑
=1
   (8) 
 
Where PGibl is each generator share of base load 
demand, PGi  is the available capacity of a generator Gi, 
and PGTbl is the identified base load demand. The revenue 
during base load sharing, GBLi, can be calculated by 
replacing the SMP and PPGi value in equations (5) and (6) 
for base load demand instead of full demand. The LOLP 
and VOLL value in equation (5) were set at 1/365 and 
10000 respectively.  
The existence of base load sharing approach in the 
proposed market ensures the participation of generators 
for all trading period. This market could also reduce the 
market power exercise as a part of the generators’ 
available capacity has been used to supply the base load 
demand. This reduces the ability of least-cost generators 
to monopoly the pool market with certain bidding 
strategies.   
The revenue equation for the remaining load demand 
which is traded through bidding competition can be 
written as   
 
EGiRiRLi CPG ×=     (9) 
Where PRi is the remaining demand, and CEGi is each 
generator bid price. Thus, the generator revenue for the 
proposed market can be written as 
 
RLiBLiHMi GGG +=     (10) 
Thus, the mathematical equation for total revenue for 
all power producers will be 
 
( ) ( )∑∑
==
×+×==
k
i
EGiRiPPGibl
k
i
HMiT CPCPGG
11
][  (11) 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
A case study is discussed using Malaysia's electricity 
load demand. Fig. 5 consists of four load profile curves 
on weekday, Saturday, Sunday and public holiday that 
will be considered as an hourly load demand the IPPs 
must met for this case study. 14 chosen IPPs represent the 
generating units in the electricity dispatch system. 
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Fig. 5 Diagram of load profile for Peninsular Malaysia. 
 
Since the monetary values involved in the study are 
confidential, estimated values are being used instead.  
The case study analysis used Malaysian ringgit as the 
currency. Table 1 shows the details of the available 
capacity and bid price of the IPPs. It can be noticed that 
bid price of the IPPs varies from one generator to the 
others. This variation is due to the fuel source that the 
generators used for generation. For instance, the energy 
price for the combined cycle plant should be lower from 
the open cycle and coal plant. Coal, natural gas, diesel 
and fuel oil are non-renewable sources used by most of 
the power plants in Malaysia [4]. 
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Table 1  Details on the IPP available capacity and bid price. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The bid price and available capacity for the IPPs are 
being stacked from the least price up to the highest one to 
form a supply curve as shown in Fig. 6.  
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Fig. 6 Diagram of the aggregate supply curve from 14 
IPPs’ capacity available and bid price. 
 
For the proposed market model, the base load 
demand for weekday, Saturday, Sunday and public 
holiday are at 9105 MW, 9135 MW, 8376 MW, and 7197 
MW respectively. Fig. 7 shows typical load demand 
profile for weekday with the base load line at 9105 MW. 
The SMP at base load demand can be determined from 
the aggregated supply curve in Fig.6. For weekday, 
Saturday and Sunday base load demand; the SMP was 
RM 240. The SMP for base load demand on public 
holiday was RM 235. The remaining capacity which is 
above the base load line is allocated for bidding 
competition. Generator who submits a low bid price 
usually manages to grab the opportunity to supply the 
remaining demand.   
For example on a weekday, the peak demand was 
12900 MW. IPP1 manages to supply all 720 MW of its 
available capacity through both base load sharing and 
bidding. 444 MW was determined using base load 
sharing equation (8) and paid by multiplying the MW 
with the SMP of RM 240. The remaining 276 MW which 
supplied the remaining demand is paid using equation 
(10) with its own energy bid price of RM 180. The lowest 
demand worth of 7197 MW occurred on public holiday. 
At this hour, IPP14 as the most expensive generator still 
managed to supply 1024 MW through base load sharing 
with SMP of RM 235. IPP14 would not participate at all 
at this hour if the pool market is applied instead of the 
proposed market. Cheaper generators might end up with 
100% capacity contribution from both base load sharing 
and bidding generation. Nevertheless, the expensive 
generators will not lose the opportunity to generate even 
though it is only for the base load sharing.   
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Fig. 7 Diagram of load demand curve on weekday. 
 
The other merit to be highlighted from the proposed 
market is, that the generator efficiency is continued at the 
sufficient level despites the base load sharing mechanism. 
No Independent Power Producers (IPP) 
Available Capacity 
(MW) 
Bid Price 
(RM/MWh) 
1 Panglima Power Sdn. Bhd. 720 180 
2 GB3 Sdn. Bhd. 640 195 
3 Pahlawan Sdn. Bhd. 322 195 
4 Teknologi Tenaga Perlis Consortium  Sdn. Bhd. 650 210 
5 Prai Power Sdn. Bhd. 350 220 
6 Kapar Energy Ventures Sdn. Bhd. 2420 225 
7 YTL Power Generation Sdn. Bhd. 1170 225 
8 Genting Sanyen Power Sdn. Bhd. 740 225 
9 Port Dickson Power Sdn. Bhd. 440 235 
10 TNB Janamanjung Sdn. Bhd. 2070 240 
11 Powertek Berhad 440 240 
12 Segari Energy Ventures Sdn. Bhd 1303 255 
13 Jimah Energy Ventures Sdn. Bhd. 1400 285 
14 Tanjung Bin Power Sdn. Bhd. 2100 300 
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Using equation (8), each IPP averagely contributes 62% 
of its available capacity to the base load demand on 
weekday and Saturday, 56.8% on Sunday and 48.8% on 
public holiday. This percentage is only for base demand 
sharing excluding the percentage for bidding competition 
of the remaining demand and does not reflect the 
efficiency of each IPP. As each IPP consists of the 
different number of turbines, the efficiency of the IPP 
depends on the load capacity percentage of its turbine. 
Even though the power plant is not running at its 100% 
capacity as in the pool market, the proposed market 
ensures the capacity proportion is divided efficiently for 
all turbines. Therefore, during the base load sharing, the 
efficiency for each IPP is kept at the adequate level. For 
example, IPP14 consists of three turbines. During 
maximum load demand, two turbines operated at 92.86% 
of its capacity while during lowest load demand with one 
turbine operated, the efficiency is at 90% of its capacity. 
By using the proposed market, all IPP are able to 
maintain the turbine's load capacity percentage averagely 
at 90% even during the lowest load demand sharing on 
public holiday. 
 
 
Table 2 The percentage of IPPs’ total hour power contribution from pool and proposed market. 
 
 Weekday Saturday Sunday Public holiday 
Generator Pool Proposed Pool Proposed Pool Proposed Pool Proposed 
IPP1 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
IPP2 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
IPP3 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
IPP4 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
IPP5 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
IPP6 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
IPP7 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
IPP8 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
IPP9 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
IPP10 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 88% 100% 
IPP11 79% 100% 75% 100% 63% 100% 4% 100% 
IPP12 71% 100% 71% 100% 46% 100% 0% 100% 
IPP13 58% 100% 33% 100% 0% 100% 0% 100% 
IPP14 17% 100% 0% 100% 0% 100% 0% 100% 
 
The shortcoming of, the pool market is that it does 
not permit all IPPs to participate in the trading during low 
load demand. The low cost IPP receives more benefit 
from the trading since they are able to participate in all 
trading periods. As shown in Table 2, only ten IPPs are 
fully participating in the weekday trading with 24 hours 
power contribution. The last remaining four IPPs could 
not participate in the most trading hours unless the load 
demand is reached to the point that requires their 
participation. For instance, the IPP11 could participate 19 
hours in the pool trading during weekday, and the 
participation period is reduced to 18 hours, 15 hours and 
one hour on Saturday, Sunday and public holidays. This 
participation hour is much better compared with IPP12 
and IPP13, since they can only participate for 17 hours 
and 14 hours during weekday. On the other hand, the 
IPP14 could not participate in a weekend and public 
holiday trading since the load demand is far less from the 
point that requires the IPP14 load contribution. 
Meanwhile, in the proposed market, all IPPs are able 
to participate in the trading even though the load demand 
is low. The existence of the base load sharing approach in 
the proposed market permits the most expensive cost 
power producer, IPP14 to fully participate in the weekday 
trading compared to the pool market with only four hours 
of trading participation.  
Figs 8, 9, 10, and 11 show the comparison of hourly 
revenue for each 14 IPPs for pool and proposed market 
models on weekday, Saturday, Sunday, and public 
holiday respectively. The significance of the proposed 
market is clearly observed during the low load demand. 
Without considering the proposed market, expensive 
generators such as IPP11, IPP12, IPP13 and IPP14 could 
not get revenue on public holiday because the total 
maximum demand at that time, which is approximately 
9600 MW, is enough to be fulfilled by 12 IPPs. It is even 
worse for IPP14 which suffers zero revenue not only on 
public holiday but also on Saturday, and Sunday. It can 
be clearly observed that the proposed market guarantees 
revenue for all IPP, although in most cases, the generator 
revenue received from this market l is lower than the pool 
market. 
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Fig. 8 Diagram of IPP revenue from pool and proposed 
market on a weekday. 
 
 
 
Fig. 9 Diagram of IPP revenue from pool and proposed 
market on Saturday. 
 
 
 
Fig. 10 Diagram of IPP revenue from pool and proposed 
market on Sunday. 
 
 
 
Fig. 11 Diagram of IPP revenue from pool and proposed 
market on public holiday. 
 
Figs. 12, 13, 14 and 15 shows the total hourly 
revenue of 14 IPPs resulted from both pool and proposed 
markets for weekday, Saturday, Sunday and public 
holiday respectively.  On a weekday, it can be seen that at 
low load demand, the generator revenue for both pool and 
proposed market are quite similar. However, when the 
load demand is high, the generator revenues under pool 
market are much higher than the proposed method. This 
is due to the increasing value of SMP, which produced 
higher pool purchasing price CPP to be paid to the IPPs. 
When the proposed market is applied, the CPP value is 
reduced because base demand is considered for every 
hour.   
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Fig. 12 Diagram of total generator revenue at each hour 
for pool and proposed market (Weekday). 
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Fig. 13 Diagram of total generator revenue at each hour 
for pool and proposed market (Saturday). 
 
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
1.8
2
2.2
2.4
2.6
2.8
3
3.2
3.4
x 10
6
-th hour
G
e
n
e
ra
ti
o
n
 R
e
v
e
n
u
e
 (
R
M
)
 
 
Pool market
Proposed market
 
Fig. 14 Diagram of total generator revenue at each hour 
for pool and proposed market (Sunday). 
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Fig. 15 Diagram of total generator revenue at each hour 
for pool and proposed market (public holiday). 
 
Table 3 shows the total generator revenue for pool 
and proposed market. It can be seen that the total 
generator revenue for the pool market model is higher 
than the proposed one. However, the differences are not 
much and the fact that it is lower during the weekend is 
considered. For instance, in the weekday, the difference 
between these market models is 13%, but it reduces to 
10%, 4% and 3% for Saturday, Sunday and the public 
holidays respectively. On the other hand, in the proposed 
market, each IPP is being protected in terms of its 
revenue as each one of them shares the base load demand 
and gets satisfactory revenue from it. This situation will 
then produce a win-win situation for all parties involved 
in the trading. 
 
Table 3 Details on the IPP total revenue from pool and 
proposed market.  
 
Load profile 
type 
Pool market 
(RM millions) 
Proposed market 
(RM millions) 
Weekday 81.01 70.51 
Saturday 73.53 66.84 
Sunday 63.97 61.13 
Public holiday 52.17 50.45 
 
5. Summary 
This paper proposed a hybrid market model to satisfy 
the generator revenue adequacy under competitive 
electricity market environment. The result from the case 
study has shown that the proposed market has merit over 
the pool market in providing fair generator revenue over 
trading hours. It can be observed that at the low demand, 
the pool market cannot guarantee hourly generator 
revenue for expensive generators. Some of the IPPs might 
lose their revenue because of non-participation in the 
trading. On the other hand, with the proposed market, all 
IPPs have equal opportunities to participate in the trading 
and receive some revenue for their contribution in base 
load demand. Moreover, the efficiency of the power 
producer is always kept at the adequate level. 
In conclusion, the proposed market successfully 
overcomes the shortcomings of the existing single buyer 
market due to capacity payment obligation and the pool 
market, in the context of guaranteed revenue 
remuneration for the generator. The introduction of the 
base load demand sharing approach in the proposed 
market ensures the participation of all IPPs in the hourly 
trading period.  The proposed market is believed to be 
effective if used by the Electricity Supply Industry in 
developing countries as a first step of introducing a 
competition in their electricity market. 
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